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LORRAINE V. MARKEL: AN AUTHORITATIVE OPINION SETS THE
BAR FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE (EXCEPT
FOR COMPUTER ANIMATIONS AND SIMULATIONS)
Lindsay Kemp'
Lorraine v. Markel may have a profound impact on the world of
electronic evidence admissibility for its guidance to lawyers, but in
the area of computer animations and simulations, it carries a
mixed message. The opinion takes a progressive approach to the
unfair prejudice standard, granting broad discretion to courts to
admit computer animation and simulation into evidence. However,
the opinion takes a conservative approach to the treatment of
computer simulations as scientific evidence. Lorraine's real effect
is yet to be seen, but its on-the-fence approach to computer
animations and simulations may cause confusion. Lawyers should
therefore use extra caution in meeting all relevant standards when
introducing these forms of evidence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you have been involved in a car accident-you were
rear-ended while waiting at a red light. Your entire negligence
claim against the driver who hit you hinges on his speed at the time
of the accident. You invest thousands of dollars in computer
simulation evidence, which uses a computer program that
generates scientific evidence of the driver's speed based on the
laws of physics and the data entered into the computer, such as the
extent of the damage done to your car.2 Sadly, however, your
lawyer has failed to admit this computer simulation into evidence
properly, and your money and your proof are gone. Perhaps your
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2009.
2 See Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the
Courtroom, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional
Reform and More Judicial Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 184 (2000)
(explaining how simulations work by using such data in a scientific program).
16
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lawyer was negligent in his duties, or perhaps he was legitimately
confused as to what to do in this situation. If only your lawyer had
had an authoritative source explaining what evidentiary rules apply
to computer simulations, he may have been able to avoid his
confusion and subsequent failure. A recently decided case,
Lorraine v. Markel,3 may or may not be the authoritative source on
computer animations and simulations that he needs.
Most legal commentators would agree that "[lt]he age of
electronic evidence has arrived."' Lawyers may also be entering
an age in which they must exercise heightened levels of care in
submitting and authenticating electronic evidence.' Lorraine has
been heralded as "an excellent guide to an important aspect of the
care that may be or become necessary when parties attempt to offer
electronic information into evidence."6 The case exposes the less-
than-acceptable standard of care that at least part of the legal
community is exercising concerning the admission of electronic
evidence.' Along with the ease and familiarity of internet and
computer resources, which have led to a more informal tone in
everyone's personal and business lives,' lawyers have taken this
3241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007).
4 Michael R. Overly, Effective Discovery of Electronic Evidence, 39 ORANGE
COUNTY LAWYER 14, 22 (1997); see also Laura Catherine Daniel, The Dubious
Origins and Dangers of Clawback and Quick-Peek Agreements: An Argument
Against Their Codification in the Federal Rules ofEvidence, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 663 (2005) ("Evidence today is seemingly all electronic."); Ophir D.
Finkelthal, Scope of Electronic Discovery and Methods of Production, 38 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 1591, 1591 (2005) ("[A]pproximately 90% of documents now
originat[e] in electronic form.").
See Lorraine v. Markel, 241 F.R.D. 534, 537-38 (D. Md. 2007).
6 Patrick J. Hatfield, Jon A. Neiditz & Jay G. Safer, From E-Discovery to E-
Admissibility?: Lorraine v. Markel and What May Follow, June 1, 2007,
http://www.lordbissell.com/Newsstand/2007-06 EDiscovery Neiditz
Hatfield Safer.pdf (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
7 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 537.
8 Id. at 554 ("Perhaps because of the spontaneity and informality of e-mail,
people tend to reveal more of themselves, for better or worse, than in other more
deliberative forms of written communication."); see also John A. Wetenkamp,
The Impact of E-mail on Attorney Practice and Ethics, 34 McGEORGE L. REV.
135, 139 (2002) (discussing the informality of e-mail and how this tendency can
produce sloppy attorney work).
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informality into the courtroom by neglecting the Federal Rules of
Evidence for electronic evidence.9 What remains to be seen in the
wake of Lorraine is what new level of care lawyers will exercise
when submitting electronic evidence, as well as where Lorraine is
an effective guide and where it is not.
While Lorraine has been accepted for its educational value to
lawyers and judges regarding admissibility standards of electronic
evidence,' "it is not the purpose of this recent development to
prove the case's impact on the many forms of such evidence."
Rather, this piece explains why clear admissibility rules for
computer animations and simulations are necessary and discusses
how Lorraine sends mixed messages about the future of the
admissibility of computer animation and simulations.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Jack Lorraine and Beverly Mack ("Lorraine")
suffered a lightning strike to their boat on May 17, 2004.2 The
plaintiffs filed an insurance claim with defendant Markel American
Insurance Company ("Markel") and were compensated according
to their insurance policy. 13 Upon Lorraine's discovery of further
damage to the hull of the boat some months later, Markel refused
to issue further payment, disputing whether the damage to the hull
9 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 537 (holding that the motions for summary
judgment must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of "proper evidentiary
support," because the electronic evidence had not been authenticated).
10 Id. at 538 ("The process [of admitting electronic evidence] is complicated
by the fact that ESI [electronically stored information] comes in multiple
evidentiary 'flavors,' including e-mail, website ESI, internet postings, digital
photographs, and computer-generated documents and data files."); see also
Finkelthal, supra note 4, at 1591 (listing some of ways and formats in which
electronic information can be discovered (and for our purposes, then used as
evidence)).
" See Surety, Maryland Judge Expounds on Importance of Authenticating
Electronic Evidence, http://www.surety.com/images/whitepapers/
Lorraine v MarkelSummary Analysis.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) ("[T]he decision in
Lorraine v. Markel ... provides tremendous detail and expertise for those
interested in court use of electronically stored information (ESI)").
12 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 535.
" Id.
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was actually caused by the aforementioned lightning strike.14
After the parties negotiated a private arbitration agreement, an
arbitrator awarded $14,000 to Lorraine for some of the damage to
the hull caused by the lightning strike, rather than the $36,000 they
had claimed." Subsequently, before the Maryland district court,
Lorraine sought the full award of $36,000, while Markel sought
enforcement of the arbitrator's $14,000 award.'6
The question the parties wanted the court to answer was
whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding less than
the full amount of a potentially "all or nothing" arbitration
agreement, as the parties had negotiated by e-mail.1  The court,
however, dismissed each party's motions and refused to answer
this question because both parties failed to authenticate as
electronic evidence the e-mail they submitted with their motions.8
III. SUMMARY OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
A. What Lorraine Means to Electronic Evidence in General
The Lorraine court did more than merely dismiss motions for
summary judgment. By refusing to make a judgment without
having authenticated evidence attached to the party's motions,"
the court set an example of heightened judicial scrutiny regarding
the admissibility of electronic evidence.2 0 More importantly, the
14 [d
15 Id ("[T]he arbitrator stated, 'I find that there is a basis for an argument
regarding loss related damage. . . . The award amount must be kept in
proportion to the loss related damage only. I find that the repairs relating to that
damage should be based on a cost of $300.00 per foot ($14,000.00)."').
16 Id. at 536.
1 id.
1 Id at 537 (explaining that the parties attached copies of the e-mails without
the supporting affidavits or deposition testimony that could have authenticated
the e-mails).
19 1d
20 Id ("I further observed that the unauthenticated e-mails are a form of
computer-generated evidence that pose evidentiary issues that are highlighted
by their electronic medium.") (emphasis added); see also Hatfield, Neiditz &
Safer, supra note 6 ("In a major departure from current common practice
regarding electronic communications, the opinion states that ... the court was
not in a position to consider the emails, because no basis had been provided by
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court used the opportunity presented by the case to set out an
authoritative opinion that will guide the future actions of lawyers
and judges.2'
The Lorraine court first delineated the basic rules for the
admissibility of all types of electronic evidence, explaining that the
evidence must be: 1) relevant; (2) authenticated; (3) allowable
under the hearsay rules; (4) allowable under the original writing
(best evidence) rule; and (5) the probative value of such evidence
cannot be outweighed by any unfair prejudice.2 2 Lorraine then
the parties for admissibility or authentication."); ProofSpace, Archiving, E-
Discovery and the Authentication of Electronic Evidence,
http://www.proofspace.com/technology/discovery.php (last visited Oct. 17,
2007) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (voicing
the concern of some federal judges that lawyers or parties may have altered
electronic records before seeking to admit them and explaining that even though
"some courts will continue to view electronic business records much as paper
documents (which are rarely challenged on grounds of authenticity), attorneys
should be prepared to face more frequent challenges to e-records in the coming
years").
21 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 537 (discussing the lack of a "comprehensive
analysis of the many interrelated evidentiary issues associated with electronic
evidence" and the court's determination to "undertake[ ] a broader and more
detailed analysis of these issues than would be required simply to resolve the
specific issues presented in this case" and "provide a helpful starting place for
understanding the challenges associated with the admissibility of electronic
evidence."); see also Pike & Fischer, E-Mail, Other Electronically Stored Data
Should Be Given Strict Evidentiary Vetting, May 9, 2007,
http://www.ilrweb.com/showSingleDoc.asp?section=1&iName newslndex&do
cID=NEWS10661&pop-true (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) (summarizing Lorraine and its main points and calling the opinion
an "exhaustive evaluation of the authentication rules . . . explaining the special
significance of ESI.").
22 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 538. The court is referring to rules in the Federal
Rules of Evidence; the full interpretation by the court reads:
Whenever ESI is offered as evidence, either at trial or in summary
judgment, the following evidence rules must be considered: (1) is the
ESI relevant as determined by Rule 401 (does it have any tendency to
make some fact that is of consequence to the litigation more or less
probable than it otherwise would be); (2) if relevant under 401, is it
authentic as required by Rule 90 1(a) (can the proponent show that the
ESI is what it purports to be); (3) if the ES1 is offered for its
substantive truth, is it hearsay as defined by Rule 801, and if so, is it
covered by an applicable exception (Rules 803, 804 and 807); (4) is
9 NC JOLT ONLINE ED. 16,21 (2007)
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discussed authentication guidelines for several specific types of
electronic evidence, including computer animations and
simulations.23
B. What are Computer Animations and Simulations?
A computer animation is "the display of a sequence of
computer-generated images."24 One commentator explains the
difference between animations and simulations: "An 'animation'
used for demonstrative purposes is often referred to simply as an
animation, while an 'animation' used as substantive evidence is
often referred to as a simulation." 25 Thus, animations are simply
visual representations used to illustrate a witness's testimony.
Simulations are submitted as substantive evidence, however,
because they are "based on scientific or physical principles and
data entered into a computer, which is programmed to analyze the
data and draw a conclusion from it .... "26
C. What Lorraine Says About Computer Animations and
Simulations
The Lorraine court explained how other courts have treated
computer animations in the past. In general, courts "have allowed
the admission of computer animations if authenticated by
testimony of a witness with personal knowledge of the content of
the form of the ESI that is being offered as evidence an original or
duplicate under the original writing rule, o[r] if not, is there admissible
secondary evidence to prove the content of the ESI (Rules 1001-1008);
and (5) is the probative value of the ESI substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice or one of the other factors identified by
Rule 403, such that it should be excluded despite its relevance.
Id. (emphasis in original).
23 d at 559-61.
24 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 4.09(4)(a) (6th ed.
2005).
25 Dean A. Morande, A Class of Their Own: Model Procedural Rules and
Evidentiary Evaluation of Computer-Generated "Animations," 61 U. MIIAMI L.
REv. 1069, 1072 (2007).
26 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 559 (citing State v. Sayles, 662 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa
2003)); see also Galves, supra note 2, at 180-185 (explaining the difference
between animations and simulations); Morande, supra note 25, at 1072 73
(explaining that a simulation functions as an expert witness in itself).
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the animation, upon a showing that it fairly and adequately
portrays the facts .... "27 In Lorraine, he court clarified that,
according to past cases, the unfair prejudice rule2 8 is not violated if
the animation is "sufficiently close to the actual events and is not
confused by the jury for the real life events themselves."29 In
keeping with the purpose of providing a guide for lawyers in
submitting electronic evidence (and here, computer animations) for
admissibility, the court wrote that the most common and useful
ways for authentication are by (1) witnesses with personal
knowledge testifying to its authenticity30 and (2) testimonies of
expert witnesses.'
Concerning computer simulations, offered as substantive
evidence, the court emphasized the rule in Commercial Union v.
Boston Edison,3 2 which determined that simulations should be
treated like scientific tests, whereby the lawyer must show, among
other things, that "the program is generally accepted by the
appropriate community of scientists. Noting potential problems
and dangers that could arise with admissibility of computer
simulations, such as the erroneous entry of information into the
computer program performing the simulation,34 the Lorraine court
also emphasized that the usual methods of authenticating computer
27 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 559.
28 FED. R. EVID. 403.
29 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 559 (citing Friend v. Time Mfg. Co., No. 03-343-
TUC-CKJ 2006 WL 2135807, at *7 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2006)).
30 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1); see IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24 ("It suffices if
the witness testifies that he or she has viewed the animation and that the
animation fairly and accurately depicts the witness's version of the event.").
31 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D at 560 ("A party may
authenticate a video animation by ... the testimony of the expert who prepared
the underlying data and the computer technician who used that data to create it."
(citation omitted)).
32 591 N.E. 165 (Mass. 1992).
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 591 N.E. 165, 168 (Mass.
1992) (emphasis added). The other showings the party must make are that the
computer functions properly and that "the input and underlying equations are
sufficiently complete and accurate (and disclosed to the opposing party so that
they may challenge them)." Id.
34 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 560.
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simulations are the same for computer animations3 5 -by testimony
from witnesses with personal knowledge3 6 and by testimony from
expert witnesses."
The court also discussed the final "test" for the admissibility of
electronic evidence-unfair prejudice.3 ' Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence states: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice . . . ."3 Unfair prejudice may be
evidenced by "language that may provoke an emotional
response."40 The court furthermore explained that courts will be
more likely to consider undue prejudice where there may be "a
substantial risk that the jury may mistake [the computer animations
and simulations] for the actual events in litigation."41 Most
importantly, the court cautioned lawyers to be prepared to show
why there is no unfair prejudice under Rule 403 when they are
offering computer animations into evidence.42
IV. SIGNIFICANCE
A. Why Do We Need Clear Rules for Computer Animations and
Simulations?
Both computer animations and simulations can have a
profound effect on a jury.43 The information that can be
" Id
36 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1).
3 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3); see also Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 560 ("Thus, the
most frequent methods of authenticating computer animations are 901(b)(1)
(witness with personal knowledge), and 901(b)(3) (testimony of an expert
witness).").
38 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 583-84.
39 FED. R. EVID. 403; see also Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 583.
40 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 584 (citing Monotype Corp. v. Int'l Trade Corp., 43
F.3d 443, 450 (9th Cir. 1994)).
41 Id (citing Friend v. Time Mfg. Co., No. 03-343-TUC-CKJ 2006 WL
2135807 at *7 (D. Ariz. 2006)).
42 Id. at 584 ("[H]e or she must be prepared to demonstrate why any prejudice
is not unfair, when measured against the probative value of the evidence.").
43 See generally Morande, supra note 25 (discussing the strong influence
animations and simulations can have on a jury); Galves, supra note 2 (exploring
9 NC JOLT ONLINE ED. 16,24 (2007)
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communicated by these visual methods is extremely memorable
for a jury and can also facilitate jury understanding of the witness's
testimony.44 Moreover, computer animations and simulations are
effective ways to grab a jury's attention. Additionally, using a
well-known medium makes the jury comfortable.4 5 Some analysts
consider animations and simulations to be less expensive, faster,
and easier to understand, as well as particularly effective because
of their ability to hold the attention of the jury.46
While there are benefits to using computer animations and
simulations, there are also certain inherent dangers that increase
the need for clear evidence rules.47 First, animations and
simulations have the potential to be too influential on the jury-
Americans are accustomed to receiving visual information through
media like televisions and may be more accepting of the testimony
delivered in such a way.48 For example, the jury may accept a
computer-animated depiction of an eyewitness's testimony as fact
rather than a personal account subject to doubts and judgments of
the witness's credibility.4 9  However, some commentators have
faith in the ability of the jury to separate fact from testimony and
argue that judges should allow such evidence while instructing the
the benefits and dangers, including undue influence of a jury, of using
animations and simulations).
44 Galves, supra note 2, at 180-190 ("If a 'picture is worth a thousand words,'
then a computer-generated animation says a thousand words, sings a thousand
songs, and paints with a thousand colors all at once."); see also Elan E. Weinreb,
"Counselor, Proceed With Caution": The Use of Integrated Evidence
Presentation Systems and Computer-Generated Evidence in the Courtroom, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 393, 396 (2001) ("Computer animations or simulations . . .
are tremendously persuasive and significantly aid jurors in comprehending
difficult issues.").
45 Galves, supra note 2, at 191.
46 Id. at 197 (quoting Fred Misko, Jr. & Charles E. Ames, Using Technology
in the Management and Trial of Complex Case, COMP. L. REV. & TECH J.
Summer 1997, at 16-17, available at http://www.smu.edu/csr/Misko.pdf) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
47 See generally Morande, supra note 25 (discussing the ease with which
animations and simulations are accepted by a jury and why this is not always a
good thing).
48 Id. at 1075-76.
49 Galves, supra note 2, at 216 21.
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jury not to "overvalue" the evidence.o In other words, "judges
need to be reminded that Rule 403 should be employed 'sparingly'
. . . ."51 Other commentators believe that the unfair prejudice rule
in Rule 403 is (and should remain) extremely important, because
dissimilarities between testimonies and opinions are not always
depicted in animations and simulations and can therefore be
misleading or confusing to the jury.52
Another inherent danger in using computer animations and
simulations is that some images are too powerful and can play on a
jury's emotions, fears, or repulsions.53 For example, an animation
depicting "facial expressions, blood, or sounds like screams or
gunshots" may be overly graphic and thus be unfairly prejudicial.54
One final danger is that, "animations and simulations that contain
subtleties such as human gestures emulating emotion are likely
unduly prejudicial because they cannot generally represent such
features with sufficient accuracy.
One final consideration regarding the use of computer
simulations as evidence is that they might not be admitted.56
Developing computer animations and simulations for court is very
expensive-"complex animations can range in cost from $50,000
to over $100,000."1' The danger lies in having the computer-
generated evidence excluded for any of the five reasons Lorraine
explained, 8 including violation of the unfair prejudice rule or
50 Id at 218-21 ("Simply because Hollywood can produce special effects
showing, for example, present-day dinosaurs walking through fields ... does not
mean that most people exposed to such images are so unsophisticated that they
will say to themselves: 'I saw it on a screen, so it must be true, and now I am
incapable of even considering a contrary argument."').
51 Id at 222.
52 Morande, supra note 25, at 1117.
SId54 [d
55[d
56 See supra Part I.
Galves, supra note 2, at 288 ("In terms of sheer costs, many commentators
liken them to small Hollywood movie productions, since they can cost tens of
thousands of dollars and the initial cost can unexpectedly multiply when
revisions and modifications need to be made.").
58 Lorraine v. Markel, 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Md. 2007). As noted earlier,
the five standards are: (1) relevance; (2) authenticity; (3) allowable under the
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failure to be authenticated.5 9 If the evidence is excluded, the client
loses that entire investment and the weight of that evidence in
court. 60  For these reasons lawyers need to take every possible
precaution to ensure that the computer animation or simulation has
met applicable admissibility standards.
B. How Does Lorraine "Move Forward" by Addressing These
Dangers?
The Lorraine court took a fairly progressive approach towards
unfair prejudice in computer animations and simulations.6 ' As
noted above, one of the reasons the court gave for non-admission is
that "there is a substantial risk that the jury may mistake them for
the actual events in the litigation." 62 The evidence may be unfairly
prejudicial if there is a "confusion of the issues, or misleading [of]
the jury."63 The court acknowledged the risk that juries will
mistake the animation or simulation for the actual events, or that it
could be "distracting, confusing, or emotionally charged," 64 but
advised that cautionary instructions to juries could overcome these
problems.6 ' This confidence in cautionary instructions is why the
court required that judges be given a high degree of discretion in
determining admissibility of electronic evidence, thus advising that
the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 should be used
hearsay rules; (4) allowable under the original writing (best evidence) rule; and
(5) the probative value of such evidence cannot be outweighed by any unfair
prejudice. Id.
59 Galves, supra note 2, at 288.
60 Id. at 289 ("The unavoidable problem is that a proponent of a CGE
[computer-generated evidence] cannot obtain a ruling on its admissibility until
after it is created and shown to the judge and opposing counsel for their
reactions and arguments.").
61 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 559-560, 584.
62 Id. at 584.
6 Id.
64 d
65 Id. (citing JACK B.WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.02[2][c] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew
Bender 2d ed. 1997)) ("[I]f there is doubt about the existence of unfair prejudice
. . . it is generally better practice to admit the evidence, taking necessary
precautions of contemporaneous instructions to the jury followed by additional
admonitions in the charge.").
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sparingly. 6 Lorraine 's adoption of this permissive approach may
permit animations and simulations to become more widely
accepted in the future.
C. How Does Lorraine "Move Backward" in Addressing Some
Issues ofAuthentication of Computer Simulations?
Lorraine correctly stated that "[c]omputer simulations are
treated as a form of scientific evidence, offered for a substantive,
rather than demonstrative purpose."68 However, Lorraine hardly
mentioned that the rules of admitting scientific evidence are
governed by Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703,69 and this
omission could be confusing to a lawyer looking to Lorraine as an
authoritative and all-inclusive guide. Furthermore, the federal test
for the admissibility of scientific evidence is explained in Daubert
v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,"o whereby "[lt]he factors to
be considered are . . . whether there has been a particular degree of
acceptance [of the scientific program] within the relevant scientific
community."n1 Lorraine failed to mention the Daubert test.72
Instead, the court pointed to the Massachusetts state standard that
the program must be generally accepted by the appropriate
66 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 584. Of course, there is always a danger that the
jury might ignore or forget a cautionary instruction.
67 Galves, supra note 2, at 300. Galves hopes that:
[p]erhaps within a few years ... the lawyers, judges, and legal
scholars of tomorrow will view computer technology in the courtroom,
not so much with a skeptical or technophobic eye, poised to exclude it
under the evidentiary and procedural rules, but rather with a
commonplace acceptance and rational reliance. Indeed, they probably
will wonder how CGEs [computer-generated evidence] ever could
have been perceived as anything beyond just a more efficient and
powerful way than non-computerized exhibits to communicate
complex ideas in a persuasive and effective manner.
Id.
681 d. at 300.
69 FED. R. EVID. 702, 703; Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 560.
70 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7 Galves, supra note 2, at 255 (emphasis added).
72 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at, 560.
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community of scientists." "General acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs" is less flexible for purposes of
admissibility than Daubert's "particular degree" of acceptance.74
The term "general acceptance" may be designed to "keep out non-
established, or 'junk' science, [but] it also would keep out new,
innovative scientific techniques ... until they became established
(or 'generally accepted'), necessarily placing courts one step
behind society."7 By failing to mention the more progressive
Daubert test for computer simulations, Lorraine made a serious
omission and took an overly conservative approach which could
mislead attorneys who are wondering which standard applies in
their jurisdiction.76 This heightened standard goes against the
technological trend (as evidenced by the federal Daubert test) and
dampens the hopes that the admission of simulations as scientific
evidence will become more commonplace (and without such
difficult standards to overcome).77
V. CONCLUSION
Lorraine may have a profound impact on the field of general
electronic evidence for its clear guidance to lawyers and even
judges.78 However, it carries a mixed message for computer
animations and simulations.7 9  The Lorraine decision takes a
progressive approach to Rule 403 and unfair prejudice, allowing
for necessary protections against such prejudice while still granting
broad discretion to the courts to admit computer animations as
evidence." Lorraine seems to take a step backward, however, in
7 Id. at 548 (emphasis added) (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Boston
Edison, 591 N.E. 165 (Mass. 1992)).
74 Galves, supra note 2, at 253-254.
7 1d. at 254.
76 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. 534.
77 Galves, supra note 2, at 300 ("[T]he rules should be updated and interpreted
in their true spirit so as to not 'discriminate' against technological advances in
display technology.").
78 See Surety, supra note 11.
79 See supra Part IV. A-C.
0 See supra Part IV. B.
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the ultimate push for more technology in the courtroom through its
stringent analysis of computer simulations."
The real effect of Lorraine is yet to be seen, but its mixed
message regarding computer animations and simulations may stir
confusion as to the intended future of electronic evidence of this
sort, rather than serve as a useful resource for lawyers. In the face
of this confusion, lawyers need to be prepared, as Lorraine
advises, to defend computer animations and simulations against
allegations of unfair prejudice. Furthermore, lawyers must be
wary when submitting computer simulations as scientific evidence.
Rather than meeting the "particular degree" of acceptance for
scientific evidence as stipulated by Daubert, lawyers should be
prepared to meet the more stringent "general acceptance" standard.
Lawyers can protect themselves and their clients by paying careful
attention to these tests, and by looking beyond Lorraine to
discover the standards used in their own jurisdictions. Ultimately,
Lorraine will perhaps be most useful because it makes lawyers
aware that they must be extremely conscientious when submitting
electronic evidence for admissibility.
See supra Part IV. C.
